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In his "Duns Scotus and the Experience of Human Freedom," Joseph 
Incandela outlines three contemporary interpretations of Duns Scotus's 
understanding of freedom.1 Much of the article is devoted to explaining 
William Frank's view that Scotus embraces Anselm's understanding of free- 
dom as "the ability to keep the rectitude of the will for its own sake."* 
Frank is not alone in seeing this connection; it has been noted by, among 
others, B. M. Bonansea and Allan B. Wolter.3 There can be no doubt 
that Scotus was influenced by Anselm's thought on many issues: the sat- 
isfaction theory of the atonement, the distinction between affectio commodi 
and affectio justitiae, and the ontological argument, to name a few.4 It is 
important, however, to see exactly what the influence is, for Scotus often 
rejects Anselm's views. In particular, it is important to gauge what influ- 
ence Anselm's views about freedom exerted on Scotus's own under- 
standing of freedom. To do so, we must first look briefly at Anselm's own 
claims about free choice. 
I benefited greatly from comments on earlier versions of this article by Joseph 
Incandela and two anonymous readers of Medieval Philosophy and Theology. 
1. Thomist 56:2 (1992): 229-56. 
2. The Latin phrase potestas sewandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudi- 
nem,has been translated by the various authors I treat as "the ability to keep 
rectitude of the will for its own sake," as well as "the ability to keep uprightness of 
the will for the sake of its uprightness." They are to be treated as equivalent 
expressions. 
3. See Bonansea's Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 61; and Wolter's The Philosophical Theology 
ofJohn Duns Scotus (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 148. 
4. For Anselm's satisfaction theory of the atonement and Scotus's reaction to 
it, see my "Scotus' Departure from Anselm's Theory of the Atonement," Recherches 
de Theologie ancienne et medievab 50 (1983): 227-41. I discuss the two-affections 
theory of the will later in this article. Scotus's discussion of Anselm's ontological 
argument can be found in the DePrimoPrincipio, chap. 4, par. 65, translated by Allan 
B. Wolter as A Treatise on God as First Principb (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 
1966), p. 122. 
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In On Freedom of Choice, Anselm defines 'free choice' as "the ability to keep
uprightness of will for the sake of this uprightness itself."5 He also asserts in
the opening paragraphs of the treatise that free choice is a concept that is
univocal to God and some creatures (angels, the blessed, and human
beings). Many scholars have claimed that Anselm uses 'free will' inter-
changeably with 'free choice', and so they claim that his definition of
'freedom' is also "the ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of this
uprightness."6 Although there are difficulties if this definition defines both
'freedom' and 'free choice', apparently Scotus thought that Anselm saw the
two notions as being closely connected.7 In addition to his insistence on the
univocal nature of the concept of free choice, it is important to realize that
Anselm holds that God, the good angels, and the blessed are free, even
though they are not able to sin.8 Satan and the other fallen angels, as well
as human beings, are free, however, because they are able to follow either
their affection for benefit or their affection for justice. To clarify this point,
we must turn briefly to Anselm's treatise The Fall of Satan.
In this treatise, Anselm claims that there are two dispositions found in
the wills of human beings and of all angels before some of them fell. By
means of the first disposition, "the affection for benefit" (affectio ad com-
modum), an individual is able to will that which seems to benefit him, in the
sense of bringing him happiness. This disposition is in play, for example,
whenever a human being wills to eat, wills to protect himself, wills to gather
possessions, and so on. By means of the second disposition, "the affection
for justice" (affectio ad justitiam), an individual is able to will what an individ-
ual should do. In particular, according to Anselm, through this disposition
an individual is able to follow the commands of God.
In an intriguing thought experiment, Anselm considers the creation of
Satan in a series of distinct steps. If Satan were created with neither of the
dispositions, he would be unable to will at all. For the only way to move from
the state of not willing to the state of willing is to will, and without an already
existing ability to will, one cannot will. So, Satan must possess one of the two
5. Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues by Anselm of Canterbury,
trans, and ed. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper and Row,
1967), p. 127. The Latin text is to be found in Opera Omnia, vol. I, ed. F. S. Schmitt
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannsatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968), p. 212.
6. See Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 141, for an explicit linking of the two
concepts.
7.1 discuss these difficulties and argue for a distinction between 'freedom' and
'free choice' in Anselm's thought in "An Implicit Distinction between Freedom and
Free Choice in Anselm's Thought," in Anselm Studies III (Toronto: Mellen Press,
1995).
8. Anselm makes this point early in On Freedom of Choice.
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abilities in order to will at all. If, however, Satan were created with only the
disposition to will what is beneficial (affectio ad commodum), he would not be
free, for he could only will what seemed beneficial to him. Likewise, if he
were created with only the disposition to will what is just (affectio ad justi-
tiam), he would not be free since he could will only what is just. Satan can
be free only if he possesses both dispositions since the possession of both
dispositions is necessary for choice to exist. Thus, only if Satan can choose
between what is beneficial and what is just would he be free. The same is
true of human beings.
One fascinating aspect of Anselm's claim that the possession of both
dispositions is necessary for the freedom of human beings and Satan is
that, according to him, an agent must be in a state of ignorance about
the exact relationship between the two affections.9 For example, if the
agent were to know for certain that his ultimate benefit lies in following
justice, the agent would not be free to act in accordance with what seemed
beneficial; he could act only in accord with what is just. Likewise, if an
agent knew that he would be punished for acting in accord with what
seems to be beneficial (in distinction to what was just), he would know
that choosing the seemingly beneficial would not ultimately benefit him
and so he could choose only what is just. Consequently, he would not be
free. It follows, then, that Satan before he fell and all angels before they
fell, as well as all human beings when they act freely, must possess the two
abilities in ignorance of the fact that doing what is just is of ultimate
benefit. Moreover, the angels who did not fall and saw the punishment of
the angels who did fall now understand that acting in accord with justice
(the will of God) is in their ultimate interest. They are therefore not able
to will anything but that which is just. This ability, of course, gives them
freedom of choice, but it effectively eliminates any freedom in the sense
that human beings have freedom.
Human beings, ignorant that it is to their ultimate benefit to act in
accord with justice, retain both the affection for benefit and the affection
for justice. They are able to choose between the two affections, and, conse-
quently, they are able to sin. (Once human beings are numbered among
the blessed, they lose their ignorance and no longer have a choice between
the affections.) As Anselm points out at the end of On Freedom of Choice,
human beings have the freedom to retain uprightness of will (by serving
justice) or to lose it (by rejecting justice). Once they have lost uprightness
of will, they can regain it or never regain it. God's grace plays an important
9. This position is made very clear in The Fall of Satan, chaps. 21-25. It is
difficult to ascertain precisely what Anselm means by 'know' when he talks about
'knowing' that one's ultimate benefit is the same as following justice. Believing
Christians, for example, hold that their ultimate benefit (the beatific vision) is
achieved by doing what is just. Presumably, this does not qualify as the knowledge
Anselm has in mind. This knowledge seems to be something like an absolute
certainty from seeing it to be the case that one's ultimate benefit is to serve justice.
God has this knowledge, of course, as do the angels and the blessed.
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role here in addition to the choice to follow justice.10 The fallen angels, in
contrast, are never able to regain uprightness of will. Even though they,
presumably, possess the two affections, they will not receive God's grace and
be restored to uprightness of will. Their fall is irrevocable.
Although this is only a brief sketch of Anselm's intriguing comments
on free choice and freedom, it reveals the key elements of Anselm's views
that Scotus cites in his texts. How much of Anselm's views did Scotus
endorse? Let us turn to Scotus's own texts, cited by Bonansea and Frank, to
answer this question.
II
In chapter two of his Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus, Bonan-
sea claims that, following Augustine, Anselm defines 'freedom' as "the ability
to keep uprightness of the will for the sake of this uprightness itself."11 He
also says that Scotus endorsed Anselm's definition of freedom and made it his
own. In defense of this claim, Bonansea provides a number of citations from
Scotus's works. The first citation is from Ordinatiol, distinction 8, part 1, ques-
tion 3: "Whether it is consistent with divine simplicity that God or anything
formally said of God be in a genus."12 This question discusses how concepts
may be univocally said of God and creatures.13 In the section of the question
Bonansea cites, Scotus is describing how concepts found in creatures are
made univocal to God and creatures by separating out imperfections found
in creaturely concepts.14 Scotus attributes to Anselm the claim that free
10. Stanley Kane treats the role of God's grace in Anselm's Doctήne of Freedom
and the Will (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1981), pp. 160f. But see also Jasper
Hopkins's negative assessment of Kane's treatment of Anselm: "Anselm on Freedom
and the Will: A Discussion of G. Stanley Kane's Interpretation of Anselm," Philosophy
Research Archives 9 (1983): 471-94.
11. Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God, p. 61.
12. Opera Omnia, Vatican ed., vol. 4, pp. 169f. (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis
Vaticanis, 1950).
13. I discuss Scotus's doctrine of univocity in "Duns Scotus' Epistemological
Doctrine of Univocity," Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1978.
14. Ordinatio I, dist. 8, pt. 1, q. 3 (Vatican ed., vol. 4, pp. 185-86). Scotus
explains how we construct univocal concepts in this way. We first find a notion of a
property found in creatures that we also want to attribute to God, for example,
wisdom. We construct a common concept by stripping away all imperfections
associated with the presence of the property in creatures. We can then determine
this common concept in one of two ways. We can determine it to apply to God by
adding the notion of infinite to the common concept and create the determinate
concept, for example, infinite wisdom, that applies only to God. We can also
determine it to human beings by adding a notion like finite or limited to the
common concept and create the determinate concept, for example, finite wisdom,
that applies to human beings. See my "Doctrine of Univocity," pp. 42-72, for a
discussion of this and the relevant texts from Scotus.
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choice is a concept univocal to God and creatures based on Anselm's criti-
cism in On Freedom of Choice ofthe view that 'free will' is to be defined as the
'power to sin'. Scotus also affirms that there is a univocal concept of free
choice common to God and some creatures and that this univocal concept is
not the power to sin. So Scotus and Anselm agree that there is a univocal con-
cept of free choice. Scotus does not, however, claim here that the univocal
concept is the ability to follow uprightness of the will for the sake of upright-
ness, nor does he claim that the univocal concept as it is determined to crea-
tures is to be identified with this definition.
The second citation is from the Opus Oxoniense II, distinction 7, ques-
tion 1: "Whether an evil angel necessarily wills evilly."15 Scotus opens the
question with several opinions that evil angels do not necessarily will evilly.
One of these opinions is based on Anselm's views. As stated, the opinion
argues that since Anselm regards free choice as the ability to keep upright-
ness of the will for its own sake, and evil angels retain this ability even after
their fall, evil angels do not necessarily will evilly; they can will well. At the
end of the discussion of the whole question, Scotus claims that the evil
angels possess free choice.16 But he does not base his view on Anselm's
definition of 'free choice' as "the ability to keep uprightness of the will for
its own sake." In offering his own view, Scotus refers the reader to Anselm's
claim that "to be able to sin" (posse peccare) is no part of liberty (libertas).
Scotus goes on to point out that one must be careful to distinguish "to be
able to sin" (possepeccare) from "power for sinning" (potentia ad peccandum).
According to Scotus, "to be a able to sin" (posse peccare) is ordered to a
deformed act and consequently is not part of free choice. "Power for
sinning" (potentia ad peccandum) is, however, different and can be a part of
free choice if understood in the correct way. In explaining how it should be
understood, Scotus says that this power for sinning (potentia ad peccandum)
contains two elements: one is an ability (posse) and the other is a deficiency
(deficere).17 The ability (posse) by which one can sin is part of free choice.
This ability can be seen as a "positive power for willing," and this positive
power for willing is common to all free choice—whether it be the free
choice of God, of the blessed, or of human beings. If this positive power for
willing is unimpeded, it results in good acts. If the second element, a
deficiency, is present, however, the result is sin. Where the positive power
for willing is found (even when it is coupled with a defect and results in sin),
free choice is also found. Since evil angels retain the positive power for
willing, they retain free choice. Unfortunately, their willing is connected
with the defect of having turned from God, and so they are in the state of
15. Opera Omnia, Vives ed., vol. 12, pp. 372bf. (Paris: L. Vives, 1893). When I
refer to the version of the Ordinatio found in the Vatican edition, I specify Ordinatio.
When I refer to the version found in the Vives edition, I specify Opus Oxoniense.
16. Opus Oxoniense II, p. 406a.
17. I follow the advice of an anonymous reader in translating parts of this
difficult section of Scotus's question.
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sin. The saints, however, as well as the good angels, exercise their positive
power for willing without defect.
Having offered this analysis at the end of this section of the question,
Scotus briefly discusses an argument based on Anselm's definition of 'free
choice' as the "ability to preserve rectitude for its own sake," to the effect
that the evil angels, possessing this ability, can keep rectitude and not be in
a state of sin. In his discussion, Scotus does not embrace Anselm's definition
of'freedom' as the ability to preserve rectitude for its own sake. His concern
is only to show that Anselm is not to be understood as suggesting that the
evil angels have the ability not to be in a state of sin. Thus the text of Opus
Oxoniense II, distinction 7, question 1, does not show that Scotus embraces
Anselm's definition of freedom.
This is also the case with the third citation Bonansea provides: Opus
Oxoniense II, distinction 44: "Whether the power of sinning (potentia pec-
candi) is from God."1 8 The question focuses on the issue of God's role in
the sins of human beings. Does He give us an ordering to sin or does He
give us a power that we use for sin? Scotus chooses the latter option. To
make his point, he once again cites Anselm's claim that "to be able to sin"
(posse peccare) is not liberty or a part of it.19 In elaboration of Anselm, he
claims that the power of sinning (potentia peccandΐ) can be understood
either as an immediate ordering to the act of sinning or as the foundation
by which someone can sin. He distinguishes two senses of the "immediate
order" reading, but his interest is really in the "foundation" reading. He
draws an analogy with passive powers, in which it is the same power that
either has something or is deprived of it. (An example of this, perhaps,
would be the power of taste. It is the same power of taste that tastes a
sour-ball candy or is deprived of tasting a sour-ball candy.) The point Scotus
is trying to make with the analogy is that the positive free power found in
human beings can be the source for either the good done through the
power when it is exercised or the evil done when the power is used defec-
tively. It is the positive free power that is given by God. Since this positive
free power can be used by human beings in a defective way to sin, God gives
human beings the power of sinning (potentia peccandϊ) . 2 0 Scotus goes on to
point out that there is a univocal concept of liberty (libertas) common to
God and creatures.21 "To be able to sin" (posse peccare) is, of course, not
18. Vives ed., vol. 13, pp. 496bf.
19. Vives ed., vol. 13, pp. 496bf. Alan B. Wolter has translated this question in
Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1986), pp. 458-63.
20. Vives ed., vol. 13, pp. 497a and b. Compare Wolter, Will and Morality, p. 460.
As pointed out by an anonymous reader, Scotus's example of passive powers (and
my sour-ball illustration) is best understood as an example of the contrast between
having something and lacking it. But what Scotus wants to illustrate is the contrast
between exercising a power and using it defectively, and this contrast is not captured
well by his example.
21. Vives ed., vol. 13, pp. 497a and b.
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found in God; nor is it part of the univocal concept of liberty common to
God and creatures. The positive free power, which serves as the foundation
for the sinning of human beings through defective use of the free power, is
part of the univocal concept and is found in both God and human beings.22
God, of course, never uses the positive free power to do evil, even though
human beings use it defectively in this way.
Despite Bonansea's statements, this text seems to undermine any claim
that Scotus sees freedom as being identical to the ability to follow rectitude
for its own sake. On the contrary, freedom for Scotus seems to be closely
related to a positive free power that is manifested differently in God and in
human beings.
Ill
William Frank has recently argued that the (Quodlibetal Questions, especially
question 16, lend considerable support to linking Scotus's view of freedom
to Anselm's notion of keeping uprightness of will for its own sake (which
Frank labels firmitas.) He states the connection most clearly in his 'John
Duns Scotus' Quodlibetal Teaching on the Will":
The argument we find ourselves developing is in all points similar to
that posed by St. Anselm in his De libertate arbitήi. In light of Anselm and
Scotus' agreement on the nature of free will as ability to adhere to the
good, the convergence is not surprising. Scotus' theory of the will is
more developed than his Benedictine ancestor's. The intervention of
some two hundred years of a living tradition comes to fruit in the
thought of Duns Scotus.23
Frank is less explicit about Scotus's connection to Anselm in his article
"Duns Scotus' Concept of Willing Freely: What Divine Freedom Beyond
Choice Teaches Us."2 4 Since the article presents many of the essential
components of his longer work, there is no reason to think he abandons
the connection in the former.
The bulk of Frank's argument depends on a close analysis of question 16
of the Quodlibetal Questions: "Are Freedom of Will and Natural Necessity Com-
patible as Regards the Same Act and Object?"25 This question is, in turn, di-
vided into three articles: "Is There Necessity in Any Act of the Will?" "Can
22. Vives ed., vol. 13, p. 498a; Wolter, Will and Morality, p. 462. On p. 11 of his
introduction, Wolter identifies God's freedom with the potentiality to will the
opposite.
23. Ph.D. thesis, Catholic Univesity of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 207.
24. Franciscan Studies 42 (1982).
25. Translated in Allan B. Wolter and Felix Alluntis, trans. God and Creatures
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 369f. Vives ed., vol. 26, pp.
180f.
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Freedom and Necessity Coexist in the Will?" "Can Natural Necessity Ever Co-
exist with Freedom?" The first article presents the beginning of a puzzle that
is carried into the second article. God is obviously the most free of all beings.
Yet, there are at least two necessary acts God performs: God necessarily loves
Himself and God necessarily spirates the Holy Spirit as the third person of the
Trinity. It is clear, then, that there are at least two acts of a will, that is, God's
will, in which necessity is found. The same necessities do not, however, occur
in the wills of finite beings like human beings. Human beings do not, of
course, spirate the Holy Spirit, nor are they necessitated to love the final end;
for they can cease to think about the end or even be prevented from willing
the end by some external factor.26 Scotus is thus careful to distinguish divine
acts of the will from the acts of the wills of finite creatures.
Having established in the first article that there is necessity in acts of the
will (i.e., necessity in two of God's acts of will), Scotus then adresses in the
second article—"Can Freedom and Necessity Coexist in the Will?"—how
such necessity is compatible with freedom. He begins his discussion with two
citations from authorities that freedom is compatible with necessity.27 The
first is from Augustine's Enchiήdion. Here Augustine claims that in the pre-
sent life human beings are free because they have the power to will both good
and evil. In the next life, however, human beings will not be able to will evil
and yet they will retain their free will. In fact, they will be freer in that they will
not be able to sin. The second citation is from Anselm's On Freedom of Choice,
and it follows a similar line. Here Anselm states that "someone who has what
is appropriate and advantageous in such a way that it cannot be lost is freer
than he who has this in such a way that it can be lost." This point leads to the
conclusion that "the will then which cannot cease to be upright is freer."28
Both of the citations from authority indicate that freedom is to be found even
where the agent cannot do otherwise. Thus freedom must be compatible
with necessitation. Scotus then offers three arguments from reason to estab-
lish that freedom can coexist with necessity.
The first argument is of less interest than the other two.29 In fact, the
26. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 370. Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 181a. See
also Frank's " Quodlϊbetal Teaching" p. 50.
27. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, pp. 377-78. Vives ed., vol. 26, pp.
193bf.
28. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 378. Vives ed., vol. 26, pp. 194af.
29. The first argument is this (Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 348,
and Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 194a): if a power acts with respect to an object insofar as it
is related to a second object, the same power obviously acts with respect to both
objects. (For example, if I practice courtesy toward my colleagues to get tenure, my
practice of courtesy is done for my colleagues as well as for my tenure.) The divine
will wills agents insofar as they are related to their final end, that is, loving God
Himself. (God creates human beings, for instance, so that they may enjoy God in
the next life.) The divine will contingently wills these agents so ordered and thus
freely wills them so ordered. This power of willing freely is an active principle in the
divine will and extends to the end for which the agents are created. Thus God freely
wills the final end, that is, loving God.
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second argument forms the basis for Frank's linking of Scotus's view of
freedom with Anselm's.30 His presentation of the argument is this:
Firmitas Argument
(1) The action which is love of the ultimate end is the most perfect
action.
(2) In love of the ultimate end, steadfastness contributes to the perfection.
(3) Hence, in the most perfect action, steadfastness contributes to its
perfection.
(4) Therefore, necessity in the action asserts what is constitutive of the
action's perfection, viz. freedom.31
In discussing this "firmitas argument" Frank tells us that premise (1) is true
of an infinite agent (God), as well as a finite agent, for example, Adam. This
is not controversial. Frank's understanding of (2) is much more controver-
sial. He states, "When love's object is the ultimate end, steadfastness on the
part of the will is an essential ingredient."32 But the text does not say this at
all. It does not say that steadfastness is an ingredient in the act of the love
of the ultimate end. It says only that in an action concerning the ultimate
end, steadfastness is of the perfection of such an action. That is, an act of
loving the ultimate end that includes steadfastness is more perfect than an
act that lacks steadfastness. As long as it is not taken to mean that steadfast-
ness is part of every act of loving the ultimate end, conclusion (3) is indeed,
as Frank says, a simple inference from (1) and (2).
Frank concludes by claiming about conclusion (4),
Now (4) makes a significant point; it seems to identify the character
of steadfastness as a manifestation of freedom. Scotus seems to suggest
that to be free with regard to the ultimate end, at least in the supremely
perfect act of love, means to be steadfast in love.33
In fact, what the Latin text says is that "the necessity in the act of loving the
final end does not destroy but rather implies (magίs ponit) that which is of
30. God and Creatures, p. 378. Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 194a. See also Frank,
"Concept of Willing Freely," p. 80, and Frank, Quodlibetal Teaching, pp. 70f.
31. Before examining this argument and Frank's comments on it, two clarifica-
tions are needed. As Frank points out, there is some controversy about premise (2).
The Vives-Wadding edition of Scotus's works and Alluntis's edition of the (Quodlibetal
Questions both have Ίibertas' instead of 'firmitas'. (See Frank, "Concept of Willing
Freely," p. 80, n. 20, and Frank, Quodlibetal Teaching, p. 70, n. 25. See also Wolter's
remarks in Will and Morality, pp. 14-15.) Moreover, in his thesis, Frank expresses
conclusions (3) and (4) above in one conclusion, which is more faithful to the Latin
text: "(3') Hence necessity, instead of precluding, actually calls for what pertains to
its perfection, viz. freedom."
32. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 81. It is important to note that throughout
my discussion I assume that steadfastness//mmfas does not admit degrees. To be
steadfast to something is to adhere continually to it; any turning away eliminates
steadfastness//mmfas. I believe Frank also accepts this point (see note 36 below).
33. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 81.
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its perfection, that is liberty." Clearly, the necessity spoken about is the
necessity involved in God's love of Himself, which is different from the
contingency involved in the love human beings have for the ultimate end.
Moreover, Scotus merely emphasizes that the necessity in the act of loving
is based on the fact that the act of loving is free. He does not, as Frank
claims, identify freedom with steadfastness even in God's act of loving
Himself.34 It appears that Frank has misinterpreted this argument.
Frank uses his understanding of the firmitas argument to claim that
Scotus has two distinct formulations of the fundamental meaning of free-
dom. The first formulation is what Frank calls "basic freedom": "the ability
to have opposite intentional objects."35 The second formulation is firmitas:
"the ability to continually adhere to the unlimitedly perfecting object."36
This ability obtains in the absence of alternatives and is consistent with
necessity. It is the latter formulation that connects Scotus's view of freedom
with Anselm's. Indeed, in the final section of his article, Frank claims that
Scotus's univocal notion of freedom consists of "active power, indetermi-
nate over-sufficiency, and firmitas."37
Unfortunately, Frank has misunderstood what Scotus means by a univo-
cal concept. This is a concept that is common to both God and creatures.38
Firmitas is not part of the common notion of freedom, for among creatures,
freedom is found in choice among alternatives.39 This is particularly true of
the love of the ultimate end, for Scotus strongly affirms the contingency of
creatures' love of the ultimate end. Firmitas (steadfastness) is a perfection
of the freedom exercised by creatures but is not an essential part of it.
Having made a choice—for example Adam's marriage to Martha instead of
to Gertrude—a creature increases the perfection of his act by remaining
steadfast to his choice. But a creature makes free choices even in cases in
which he does not remain steadfast to the choice. Firmitas is, of course, part
of any act God performs. As Scotus points out in the conclusion to article
1, question 16, of Quodlibetal Questions, God's acts are marked by the neces-
sity of immutability as opposed to the necessity of inevitability.40 The neces-
34. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 80.
35. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 81.
36. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 83.
37. "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 86.
38. See nn. 13 and 14 above. In correspondence, Joe Incandela suggests that
Frank's view that firmitas is what is univocal to God and creatures be seen in this way:
"the will of the viator has the innate ability to tend towards steadfastness. Since this
is an ability God's will always has, there is a kind of univocity here." Steadfastness
can indeed be univocal to God and creatures, for God enjoys perfect steadfastness
and rational agents are sometimes steadfast in their actions. But establishing that
steadfastness is univocal to God and creatures does not establish that steadfastness
is equivalent to freedom (in Scotus's eyes). Simply because one univocal concept
may be related to another, it does not follow that they are the same concept.
39. Frank, "Concept of Willing Freely," p. 86.
40. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, pp. 376-77. Vives ed., vol. 26, p.
190a.
ANSELM'S NOTION OF FREEDOM 15 5
sity of inevitability, on the one hand, "not only excludes change or succes-
sion but rules out that the divine will could have willed other than it has."
It is thus not appropriate to God. On the other hand, the necessity of
immutability "excludes a change of will in which at some subsequent mo-
ment the divine will would will differently than at present." Scotus explicitly
states that this necessity of immutability is appropriate to God, for if He were
to will differently after willing in a particular fashion He would have
changed, and this is inconsistent with His immutability. So firmitas is part of
all God's free acts. Since it is not an essential part of the free acts of
creatures but a perfection of them, it should not be seen as an ingredient
of those acts. Firmitas is different from freedom and is not part of any
univocal notion of freedom.
One of the appeals of Frank's identification of firmitas with freedom is
that it explains how a necessary act can be free, and he sees question 16 as
providing this explanation. In particular, Frank thinks that the identifica-
tion between firmitas and freedom can be used to show that the simple
necessity found in God's loving Himself and spirating the Holy Spirit is
consistent with their freedom. If firmitas is seen as a perfection of freedom
and is not identified with it, it is not obvious how God's necessary actions
can be seen as free. How, then, does Scotus explain how God's necessary
acts can be free? Perhaps the remaining parts of the second article of
question 16 help to answer this question.
The third argument from reason that Scotus offers to show that freedom
is consistent with necessity can be summarized in this way.41 A condition that
is intrinsic to a power either in itself or in its ordering to a perfect act must be
consistent with the most perfect act of the power. Liberty is a condition of the
will in its acts. Hence, liberty must be consistent with the most perfect act of
the will. As was shown in the first article of question 16, God's necessarily
loving Himself is one of the perfect acts of His will, which is free. Hence,
liberty must be consistent with God's necessarily loving Himself.
This argument from reason does not show how freedom is consistent
with necessity through a demonstration that freedom can be construed in a
way that is consistent with necessity. Rather, it points out that if the acts of a
being are free, and necessity is the perfection of one or more of this being's
acts, necessity must be consistent with freedom. Scotus thus seems to be con-
tent in justifying his claim that necessity and freedom are consistent in God's
acts without actually providing an explanation. In fact, Scotus immediately af-
ter this second argument from reason asserts just this point: "If you ask, how
does freedom coexist with necessity, I answer with the Philosopher: 'Do not
seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for there is no dem-
onstration of the starting point of demonstration'."42 In question 16, articles
1 and 2, Scotus is not interested in defining freedom so much as using God's
41. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 378. Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 194b.
42. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 379. Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 194b.
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intrinsic acts to show that necessity is consistent with freedom. The very last
lines of the question, in fact, bring home this point:
Confirmation: The division of agents into those which act naturally
and those which act freely is not the same as the division of agents into
those acting necessarily and those acting contingently. For some natu-
ral agents act contingently, because their action can be impeded. For
like reasons, then, it is possible that some free agent act necessarily
without detriment to its freedom.43
As Frank points out, however, there is an addition to question 16 of Quod-
libetal Questions in the three manuscripts he used.44 It is a very complicated
addition, discussing among other issues various senses of necessity. The
principal point of the addition seems to be to explain the sense of freedom
found in God's act of loving Himself. The definition Scotus offers comes in
the last third of the addition: "In what, therefore, does this liberty of willing
consist? I answer: because he delightfully and, as it were, electively elicits
this act and persists in it."45
The stress in these sentences, it seems to me, is on the fact that God
delightfully elicits (chooses) the act of loving Himself; and this choice is
what liberty of willing consists of. Having made this choice, God then
continues to love Himself. This continuation is firmitas, of course, but it is
best understood as being the preservation of the free choice rather than as
being a constituent of the free choice. It is thus difficult to see these lines
as defining God's freedom as firmitas, which Frank seems to want to do. On
the contrary, they seem to indicate that liberty of will consists of choice. So
even the addition to the manuscripts provides no attempt to redefine
freedom in such a way as to explain its compatibility with necessity. Freedom
is choice among alternatives, and Scotus affirms that it is consistent with the
simple necessity of God's loving Himself and spirating the Holy Spirit.
I have not discussed the third article of question 16—"Can Natural
Necessity Ever Coexist with Freedom"—because it does not bear immedi-
ately on Frank's identification of Scotus's definition of freedom with An-
selm's. My discussion of the first two articles of this question, however, shows
that the question does not support Frank's claim that Scotus embraced
Anselm's definition of freedom. Quite simply, Frank fails to show that
Scotus regards firmitas as anything other than a perfection of freedom.
Frank also finds support for his claim of an identity between Scotus's and
Anselm's views of freedom in Scotus's endorsement of Anselm's two-affec-
43. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 379. Vives ed., vol. 26, p. 195a.
44. Quodlibetal Teaching, pp. 80f.
45. My translation from the Latin text in Frank, Quodlibetal Teaching, p. 216: "In
quo igitur est ista libertas volendi? Respondeo: quia delectabiliter et quasi eligi-
biliter elicit actum, et permanet in actu." Frank's translation (Quodlibetal Teaching,
p. 84) of the critical part of the passage is "I answer it consists in the fact that he
elicits this act and preserves in it as something delightful which he has elected, as
it were, to do."
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tions theory of the will.46 There can be no doubt that Scotus was influenced
by Anselm and appropriated many aspects of Anselm's two-affections theory.
Nonetheless, Scotus's embrace of the theory does not lead him to an em-
brace of Anselm's definition of freedom as the ability to serve uprightness of
will for its own sake. To see this, we must examine Frank's argument.47
Scotus agrees with Anselm that human beings, in their nature, possess
an affectio commodi, which is an inclination to pursue what is to one's own
advantage.48 Anselm also holds that after the fall of Adam, the affectio
justitiae is not innate but is supernaturally infused. Scotus, however, regards
the affectio justitiae as innate to the will. In agreement with Anselm, Scotus
holds that a will that possesses only the affectio commodi cannot be free since
it can pursue only those things that are advantageous to it. Only when a will
also possesses the affectio justitiae can it be free, for with the possession of
both affections the will can choose among significant alternatives.49
In emphasizing the need for affectio justitiae, Scotus in several places
seems to identify it with freedom. In Ordinatioΐl, distinction 6, question 2—a
discussion of Lucifer's sin—Scotus calls the innate affectio justitiae "the liberty
of the will," as well as the "innate liberty of the will."50 In Opus Oxoniense III,
distinction 26, note 17, after citing Anselm's claim in OnFreedom of Choice and
The Fall of Satan that there are two affections, Scotus claims that the affectio
justitiaeis superior to the affectio commodi. In its innate form—as opposed to its
acquired or infused forms—affectio justitiae is natural (ingenita) freedom, for
it allows a human being to choose other than what is to his own advantage.51
Frank emphasizes this identification and argues that Scotus's notion of in-
nate affectio justitiaeis to conform one's volitions and acts to a higher will, that
is, God's. Thus "any free act is an act in accordance with the order of justice,"
which is to act in conformity with rectitude. Therefore, freedom is the ability
to conform to the good, and this sense of freedom, according to Frank, is a
development of Anselm's own definition of'freedom'.52
46. Quodlibetal Teaching, pp. 19If.
47. The argument is best presented in Quodlibetal Teaching on pp. 191-97 and
201-3.
48. In Opus Oxoniense III, dist. 15, n. 19 (Vives ed., vol. 14, p. 592), Scotus
suggests that affectio commodi is based on a more basic affectio amicitiae.
49. John Boler has recently argued that freedom for Scotus does not involve
choice between the two affections; it requires only the agent's ability to choose or
refrain from choosing. This "superabundant sufficiency" can occur even if the agent
possesses only one of the two dispositions. See "Transcending the Natural: Duns
Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will," The American Catholic Philosophical Quar-
terly 69:1 (Winter 1993): 115-16. Boler's view requires extended treatment, which I
cannot offer here, but it appears from the texts I discuss that Scotus does link
freedom with possession of the two dispositions.
50. Found in Wolter, Will and Morality, p. 468.
51. Vives ed., vol. 15, pp. 340-41.
52. Frank, Quodlibetal Teaching, pp. 196-97, 201. In Philosophical Theology, p. 149,
Wolter calls Scotus's view about positive freedom Anselmian. On p. 152, he talks
about the affectio justitiae as the root freedom of the will.
158 DOUGLAS LANGSTON
Frank's argument is ingenious, but it has significant difficulties. First,
if freedom of the will were equivalent to the innate affectio justitiae, a being
who possessed only this affectio and lacked (an impossibility) the affectio
commodi would be free. As we have seen, Scotus (and Anselm) rejects this
view and holds that a human being is free only if he possesses both affec-
tions. Second, there are passages in which Scotus distinguishes freedom
from the affectio justitiae. In Opus Oxoniense IV, distinction 49, question 5,
note 3, he talks about how the latter belongs to the will insofar as it is free.
In Opus Oxoniense IV, distinction 10, notes 11-14, he discusses how the
affectio commodi is in the will even without freedom or the presence of the
affectio justitiae and that with the presence of both affections, the will has the
freedom to will something other than what is to its advantage.53 These
passages suggest a view of affectio justitiae that is different from Frank's
identification of it with freedom. Freedom is not to be identified with the
affectio justitiae; rather, freedom occurs when an agent possesses both the
affectio commodi and the affectio justitiae. Only when the two affections are
present is there choice among alternatives, which is the basic Scotistic
notion of freedom. Since there is no disagreement between Scotus and
Anselm that the affectio commodi is innate to human beings, Scotus tends to
talk about the presence of affectio justitiae as yielding freedom. While one
might regard this tendency as an equation of freedom with the affectio
justitiae, as Frank does, it is important to realize that it is the presence of
both affections that yields freedom. Of course, the fact that an agent has
both affections and thus is free does not entail that any act he performs is
free. Acts performed under the coercion of an external agent, for example,
are not free.54
IV
We have seen no evidence in the Quodlϊbetal Questions or in various other
texts in which Scotus cites Anselm's view of free choice that he endorses
the view that freedom is to be equated with the ability to serve uprightness
of will for the sake of this uprightness. Nor does Scotus's embrace of
Anselm's two-affections theory of the will lead us to think that he endorses
the definition. On the contrary, the texts reveal that Scotus's own view
of freedom is more properly connected with what has been called "basic
53. Vives ed., vol. 21, pp. 172, 379-81.
54. Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, pp. 379-80. Wolter, Will and Morality,
pp. 174f.
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freedom": the ability to choose among alternatives.55 This is the concept
of freedom that is univocal to God and creatures. As part of this notion,
it is clear that a will that is free is in control of its own actions; it cannot
be compelled or forced to act in a certain way by an external agent. It
is not even dominated by reason, for a free will can reject what right
reason dictates. To be sure, a free will is more perfect to the degree that
it follows right reason and remains steadfast in this pursuit. But this is a
perfection of freedom and is not to be identified with it.
55. In my God's Willing Knowledge: Scotus'Analysis of God's Omniscience (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), I analyze Scotus's conception of
freedom in chapters 2 and 3. Although I do not use the notion of "basic freedom"
to discuss his view of freedom, I show that the ability to choose among alternatives
is an important component of that view. One can refer to these chapters to see why
I say here that the univocal concept of freedom involves choice among alternatives.
I also argue in the book that once Scotus's analysis of God's omniscience is taken
into account, his conception of freedom must be seen as a form of compatibilism,
which still allows the will's self-determination.

